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AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND LAW OF
CORPORATIONS-PART I.
The Nature of a Corporation.
As in all other inquiries, no satisfactory result will be
attained until, as a basis of reasoning, a true definition is
reached. What, then, is a corporation? Many definitions
have been advanced and accepted, but no one yet advanced
has been found to meet the exigencies of all corporate ques-
tions; no definition has been given to which the courts in all
corporate cases have been able to refer as the basis from
which to reason out the questions involved. On the contrary,
the courts have usually been compelled to make a definition
to suit the particular case in hand, rather than to decide the
case according to any accepted definition.
It will be of interest to examine, first, several of the most
famous definitions, and we will consider shortly three, each
accepted for many purposes. These three are cited not only
because they are among the very best ever advanced, but also
because they are typical of the three classes into which, prob-
ably, all the definitions may be divided. Quoting them in
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their chronological order: Mr. Kyd, in his well-known work
on corporations, being almost the first English treatise on the
subject, at page 13 of the introduction, says: "A corpora-
tion, then, or a body politic, or a body incorporate, is a col-
lection of many individuals united in one body, under a
special denomination, having perpetual succession under an
artificial form, invested by the policy of the law- with a
capacity of acting in several respects as an individual, particu-"
larly of taking and granting property, of contracting obliga-
tions, and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and
immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political
rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its
institution or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time
of its creation or at any subsequent period of its existence."
Chief Justice Marshall, in the Dartmouth College Case,'
defines, or rather characterizes, a corporation as an "artificial
being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation
of law."
Justice Field, in the case of the Pembina Mining Company
v. Pennsylvania,2 says with reference to private stock corpora-.
tions: "Such corporations are merely associations of indi-
viduals united for a special purpose and permitted to do busi-
ness under a particular name, and having a succession of
members without dissolution;" thus evidently, in opposition
to the definition of Chief Justice Marshall, reverting more or
less to the definition first given by Mr. Kyd.
These definitions all contain truth, but a little thought will
show that not one of them is satisfactory or complete. A
corporation is evidently in one sense, as said by Justice Field,
composed of persons, since in a sense it cannot be composed
in any other way; but, as evidently, it is something more.
A, B and C may compose a corporation, as if, for instance,
they are the incorporated trustees of a university; but. as evi-
dently, the university of which they are such trustees is in the
law something more than the association of the three, since it
is something separate and distinct from each and all of them.
'4 Wheaton, 636 (18i9).
2,25 U. S. 189 (1887).
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This fact is equally plain when we consider corporations
less simple in their nature than eleemosynary bodies. Take
commercial stock corporation, with reference to which Justice
Field gives his definition. Of what persons is it composed?
If it is an aggregation of persons, of what persons ? Justice
Field and the other jurists, who have advanced similar defini-
tions, would, we may assume, answer, "the stockholders."
But in such answer hey would disagree, not merely with
Chief Justice Marshall, who ably treats of this particular sub-
ject in his dissenting opinion in the case of the United States
Bank v. Dandige, 1 but will also put themselves in opposition
to certain corporate facts.
A corporation is only an aggregation of stockholders, in
the sense that they are the ultimate owners of its property.
The word ultimate is used advisedly, because ihey possess no
actual existing legal interest therein whatever; and even in a
case of dissolution, when their actual legal rights first accrue,
such rights are not primary, but are entirely subsidiary to the
rights of all persons who have claims resulting from the
action of the corporation itself. The stockholders are in the
position of the heirs, or next of kin, or residuary legatees of
a living person. Their legal rights only vest upon disso-
lution, and then entirely subject to the contracts and obliga-
tions of the late corporation. A private stock company,
indeed, exists primarily for the benefit of its stockholders,
who, therefore, have certain equitable rights to prevent the
waste of its assets and, subject to the discretion of the direc-
tors, have certain rights to share in its profits, and, upon its
dissolution, as already suggested, are in the position of re-
siduary legatees of its assets; but in no other sense can they
be said to compose the corporation.
Going a step farther, the absurdity of treating the stock-
holders as a corporation becomes even more apparent. If
* they were, for all purposes, the corporation, they would cer-
tainly exercise its powers, its functions; but, in fact, they do
not, and cannot so do. Such powers are exercised by the
directors. When the directors, in their corporate capacity,
12 Wheaton, 113 (1827).
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act, the corporation acts, and not otherwise. In certain cases,
to be sure, the stockholders are g!ven, by statute, a certain
control or veto power over the action of the directors; but,
except under such statutes, for the purpose of using the cor-
porate property, for the purpose of exercising the corporate
franchise, in which user the legal title thereto is certainly
found, the directors and not the stockholders are the corpora-
tion. The stockholders, indeed, usually elect the directors,
but such accidental fact cannot affect the question one way or
the other.
Apparently, therefore, Chief Justice Marshall was entirely
right in the case of United States Bank v. Dandnge, in the
opinion that, in so far as a stock corporation is an aggregation
of individuals, it is composed rather of its directors than of its.
stockholders, since they not onl'y can, but are the only per-
sons who can, use its property, exercise its functions and act
in its name-the stockholders being merely the ultimate dis-
tributees of its property and profits. If we endeavor to
apply Justice Field's definition to other than private stock
corporations, of which he was speaking, its inadequacy be-
comes all the more apparent; and this application should
certainly be a fair test, since we all realize that the corporate
conception, the corporate idea, which distinguishes corpora-
tions from other persons known to the law, exists in all cor-
porations. Public and private corporations differ only in
their purposes-otherwise they are identical legal entities, and
any true definition necessarily includes them both.
Who. then, according to the definition of Justice Field,
would compose a municipal corporation? In one sense in
which a private corporation may be said to be composed of
its stockholders-that is, in that they are the ultimate owners
of its assets-the municipal corporation would be said to be
composed of its taxpayers; while in another sense in which
a private corporation may be said to be composed of its
stockholders-that is, in that they elect the directors-the
municipal corporation would be composed of the voters. But
in the .ense in which a private corporation is more properly
said to be composed of its directors-in that they are the
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persons who use its property and exercise its functions-a
municipal corporation would evidently be composed of the
various persons or boards who are authorized by its charter
to exercise its various functions. For most purposes it would
apparently be composed of the mayor and city council; for
others, however, it might be composed simply of the city
chamberlain; or for others of special boards, such as water
boards, park boards, or the like, provided such boards were
authorized to exercise any of the corporate functions in the
corporate name. Likewise an eleemosynary corporation, such
as a college, if simply an aggregation of persons, would be
composed, for various purposes, of aggregations of various
persons. For some purposes a college may be said to consist
of all persons connected with it, whether students or profes-
sors. For most purposes it- is usually, under its charter, com-
posed of its trustees; but for others, again, its charter may
compose it of its faculty-or even, indeed, of its alumni-if
by such charter, as is sometimes the case, such various bodies
are authorized to act for various purposes -in the name of
such corporation. For any particular purpose, indeed, a cor-
poration, in so far as it is an aggregation of persons, is com-
posed of those persons who are authorized to act in its name
for such purpose; and hence the confusion resulting from the
attempt of various jurists to define a corporation as an aggre-
gation of any special set of persons. Plainly, indeed, there-
fore, a corporation is more than an aggregation of persons,
being a legal entity composed for each special put-pose; of
various persons, indeed, but of different persons for different
purposes; and Chief Justice Marshall was entirely right in
his statement" that, independent of all natural persons con-
nected with it, a corporation is in itself " an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law." Yet, at first sight, this characterization conveys to our
minds no definite idea, and would seem to be a mere meta-
physical subtilty of no particular utility. But further reflec-
tion and inquiry will show that this existence of a corporation
as a legal entity, as an artificial 1erson, is a practical fact,
founded in the very nature of the law itself.
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The common law, properly speaking, deals not with per-
sons, but with their rights and duties. A, B and C may,
indeed, be living persons, but are not, as such, recognized and
known to the law, but only through their right to do, or their
obligation to refrain from doing, this or that act. So long as
their rights are not infringed, nor they infringe the rights of
others, the law takes no note of them; it simply protects
their rights and compels the performance of their duties. The
law, indeed, may be said to consist of the rights and duties of
persons as enforced by the state; or since, as is well known,
duties are but complementary to rights-it being the duty of
every person to recognize and submit to the rights of others-.
this definition may be further modified, and the law may be
simply said to consist of the rights of persons as enforced by
the state.
Such being the nature of the common law, it follows, as
already suggested, that individuals exist in the law, not as
persons of flesh and blood, but merely as the subject of certain
general and special rights, with the corresponding duties and
penalties. We say rights general and special, because, with
reference to general rights of persons and of property, they
are divided into classes-such as men, women, infants and
corporations-each class being the subject of certain general
rights; while it is with reference to their special rights, which
grow out of the exercise or breach of their general rights,
that the individual members of these classes are distinguished
one from another-as, for instance, the right to purchase and
hold property is predicated of all men of legal age, not non
compos mentis, while the right to purchase or own an indi-
vidual piece of property is predicated only of a person under-
taking to exercise this general right, and then serves to dis-
tinguish him from all other persons of his class. In contem-
plation of law, therefore, a person is but the subject of certain
rights, duties and penalties; and, conversely, it follows that t
such rights, duties or penalties are predicated of an imaginary
being, vested with a name, such imaginary being, by such
name, as a subject of such rights, duties or penalties, will im-
mediately exist in contemplation of law as an artificial person.
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That this is the true nature of the law, and the true position
of persons with regard thereto, is made manifest not merely
through the analysis thereof, but also by the consideration of
some legal phenomena. We will assume, for example, that
Richard Roe, the subject of the general rights of property-
and, in addition thereto, the subject of the special rights con-
nected with the ownership of the estate of Black Acre-dies,
unknown to anyone at home, in a foreign country. Although
he is actually dead, no longer existing in flesh and blood as
a natural person, in the absence of all proof to that effect
whereby by the action of the law his property rights will de-
volve upon other persons, he still continues to exist, in con-
templation of law, as the subject of such rights. He will still,
in contemplation of law, be an existing person, not only as
the subject of the general rights of the property predicated of
all persons, but also as the subject of the special rights flowing
from the ownership of the estate of Black Acre. It may
be that on account of his actual death he may not practically
be able to exercise all of the property rights predicated of
him, but this would equally be the case if he were simply
absent and without representation, while he would still be
able, although dead, through his agents, to collect the rents
from his estate, and to that end, or the purpose of punishing
or preventing trespass, or maintaining any other property
right connected therewith, to instigate and conduct actions in
law and equity; and, as the owner of such estate, he will be
held, although dead, liable in the law for the improper or
illegal acts of his servants and agents in the administration
thereof. Indeed, further than this, if his agents are in the
possession of the- necessary funds or credits, he will be per-
mitted, in the exercise of his general property -rights, to pur-
chase and become the owner of other and additional prop-
erty, real and personal. As a subject, therefore, of these
various rights, duties and penalties, he continues in contem-
plation of law an existing person, even though in fact dead.
Similarly suggestive is the reverse doctrine known as civil
death, almost obsolete, but still illustrative of this peculiar
character of our law. According to this doctrine a person
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
still living, but convicted of certain penal offences, thereupon
becomes, in contemplation of law, divested of all his property
rights, and, therefore, in the eye of. the law, although actually.
living, dead. This death in the law is not and never has
been, in fact, complete, although in old times it used to be
assumed so to be, because, while ceasing to exist as a subject.
of the general property rights, such convicted person still
continued to live as the subject of certain personal rights,.
duties and penalties.
We have also the similar case of a living person, whose-
property rights, after an unexplained absence of several years,.
have Dy the action of the law devolved upon a successor, and
who, therefore, although living in fact, becomes dead in the
law. Such legal death is evidently not, as is generally as-
sumed, the cause, but is, as a matter of fact, simply the result
of the necessity of transferring the property rights of a living
person to a successor.
The case of a corporation is analagous to the first illuistra-
tion above given of a person actually dead, but still existing
in the law as the subject under his own name of certain rights,
duties and penalties. If certain rights, duties or penalties are
predicated of anything, metaphysical or otherwise, or predi-
cated of any or of various persons, but under some special
name giving the subject thereof an identity, such thing, such
being, such person or aggregation of persons known by such
name, becomes and is in contemplation of law, as the subject
of such rights, duties or penalties, a person-an artificial
person indeed-but, nevertheless, as much a person as any
living man. Such artificial person or corporation like the
dead person alread cited, not possessing the natural faculties,
can, of course, only exercise its rights, perform its duties,
through natural agents, that is, through natural persons in
the exercise of their legal rights; but its rights are in no.
sense predicated of these agents or any of the various persons
or aggregations of persons who may be said to compose the
artificial person, but of it under its own name; the artificial
person being under its own name the subject of such rights,
duties and penalties, and in truth and fact, just as much a person.
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in contemplation of law as they. But, as already suggested,
corporations are not the only artificial persons existing in the
law. On the contrary, it is evident that whenever the law
predicates rights and duties of any thing, being or person,
except of a natural person as such under his own name,
an artificial person exists. Trustees, executors and receivers
are all examples of such artificial persons. They are in
no sense agents, exercising the rights of their principals
but are, in fact, in the law, distinct persons, distinct, indeed,
from their own natural persons, as they exist in the law as the
subject of an entirely different set of special rights and duties
from those predicated of them under their own names.
Natural and artificial persons, to be sure, exercise these rights
and perform these duties through the same natural faculties,
just as directors of a corporation, whether acting as the cor-
poration,, or as partners in a different business would act
through the same natural faculties, but natural and artificial
persons so acting are in no sense identical except in the unim-
portant identity of the natural agencies through which they
act, and, therefore, only to the same extent as two corpora-
tions, with identical boards of directors ; or two trustees, filled
by one and the same natural person; while they are often
almost identical in every important respect with some other
artificial or natural person. A receiver of a corporation, for
instance, is in many respects identical with the original
corporation; an executor with his testator; and in almost
every respect a trustee, a receiver, or an executor with his
predecessor or successor in such position.
Artificial persons are, therefore, just as real in the law as
natural persons, and exist as such entirely independent of the
natural persons, who must, in the very nature of things,
exercise their rights and perform their duties. It would seem
at first sight, indeed, as if it might be said that, in contempla-
tion of law, there was not in reality any distinction between
artificial and real persons; that a natural person was, in con-
templation of law, artificial; and, that a natural and an
artificial person were, in contemplation of law, different artificial
persons, whose rights were exercised by the same natural
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person. But this is not true. An artificial person is a separate
and distinct legal conception, as such the person exists but as
a subject of property rights, while of the living person the.
personal rights of life and liberty are also predicated. "A
trustee, as such, possesses none of the rights of persons and,
therefore, for instance, cannot maintain an action for assault;
likewise a corporation, although its functions are exercised by
natural persons, possesses in itself no rights of persons and,
therefore, cannot maintain actions for the breach thereof.
But, to revert to our definition; to characterize a corpora-
tion as an artificial person is not, therefore, to deal in meta-
physics or in subtile concepts, but is simply to state a legal
fact of the greatest practical importance, which fact at'once
establishes the status of corporations and furnishes a basis
upon which, necessarily, all the doctrines of corporation law
must stand. But the definition is not yet complete; it yet
remains to distinguish corporations from other artificial
persons.
We have found a corporation to be an artificial person
existing, in contemplation of law, as a subject of certain, as
yet undefined, property rights, but that is no more than to
say that a corporation is an artificial person, since, as we have
already found, all artificial persons exist, in contemplation of
law, as the subject of certain property rights. The absence of
the rights of persons we have found to distinguish artificial
persons from natural persons. Are, then, as would seem to
be the intendment of Mr. Kyd's definition, corporations to be
distinguished from other artificial persons by the peculiar
property rights predicated of them ? Of what property rights,
then, is a corporation the subject, or, to reverse the question,
what property rights cannot be predicated of a corporation?
Apparently none. In the absence of special limitations, its
absolute rights are but those property rights characteristic of
all persons. As a person existing in law, a corporation may
sue and be sued, buy and sell real and personal property,
make contracts, and, through its failure to observe its comple-
mentary duties, may break contracts, commit torts and may
be held in the law accountable therefor; as, indeed, may all
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artificial persons; in fact, in the absence of special limitations
imposed by statute or by public policy, the law simply
rec6gnizes artificial, persons as the subject of the general
property rights, although, of course, such rights have to be
exercised in the manner provided by law. A corporation
need not possess every property right, but it may possess any
property right and, therefore, cannot be distingnished from
other artificial or natural persons by any peculiar property
rights of which it may be the subject. Mr. Kyd's definition,
therefore, is evidently not satisfactory.
Similarly with reference to the purposes for which a cor-
poration may exist. Corporations usually, if not invariably,
exist for some defined purpose, but the purpose may be
general or special, may be charitable, political or commercial,
or, as may well be conceived, a corporation might exist
simply as a person, not for any special purpose, but merely to
enable certain natural persons to exercise all the rights of
property as an artificial person under an assumed name for
any legal and proper purpose. Such a corporation, it is not
believed, has ever existed, but evidently such an artificial
person might readily be, by statute, created or authorized, and,
if created or authorized, would as evidently be a corporation
in every sense of the term. Other artificial persons can ap-
parently be more properly, although not completely, defined
with reference to their purposes; as, for instance, a trustee
can only exist for the purpose of exercising property rights
for the benefit of another or other persons ; or, a receiver to
conceive property rights in litigation, but a corporation can
exist as well for these purposes as for any or all others.
The peculiarity of a corporation, therefore, is evidently not
to be found in the purpose or purposes, general or special, for
which it may be created or authorized. In what then does
its peculiarity consist? Mr. Kyd, in his great work, page
70, expanding his definition, states that three capacities alone
are sufficient to the essence of a corporation.
I. To have pcrpetual succession under a special denomina-
tion and under an artificial form.
2. To take and grant property, to contract obligations and
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to sue and be sued by its corporate name in the same manner
as an individual.
3. To receive grants of privileges and immdnities and to.
enjoy them in common.
All will recognize that the possession of these three qualities
would constitute a corporation, but these last two qualities or.
capacities are in nowise peculiar to corporations but are pos-
sessed .by all persons, natural and artificial. All persons,
including corporations, by virtue of their recognition as such,
can take and grant property, can receive grants of privileges
and immunities, and as for enjoying the latter in common, a
corporation no more than any other person does that. These
two last qualities, therefore, in no sense distinguish or define
.a corporation, being simply predicated of it as of all other
persons; leaving for its only peculiar quality the first men-
tioned by Mr. Kyd, viz., the capacity of perpetual succession
under a special denomination and under an artificial form, or,
as it is more commonly put, the capacity of succession -under
an assumed name. It is not meant by this that a corporation
must have perpetual succession, but merely that it must pos-
sess the capacity for such succession if actual persons exist
with power to exercise its functions. Any corporation may
cease to exist by the death of all persons authorized to so act,
but, nevertheless, a corporation is not so bound up with the
identity of an actual person that, upon the death of the latter,
the former necessarily ceases to exist. The corporation exists
under an assumed name which continues to represent its prop-
erty rights regardless of the succession of persons, who may
exercise them or reap the benefit thereof, and, therefore, it,
under such assumed name, is capable of, or has the capacity
of, succession.
This capacity of succession, indeed, like its general property
rights, would seem to flow from, to be but a legal incident. of,
the legal recognition of a corporation under an assumed name.
As an artificial person recognized at law under such assumed
name, its existence is evidently independent of the existence of
the persons who exercise its powers and therefore solely by
virtue of such assumed name it is capable of, although for lack
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of means to select successors to its original corporators it may
not be actually vested with, perpetual succession.
A comparison between corporations and other artificial per-
sons will make this plain, and will, at the same time, show that
it is this one quality alone which distinguishes them from each
other. Let us note the differences between a charitable cor-
poration, or an incorporated board of trustees for a charitable
purpose and an unincorporated trustee or board of trustees.
They resemble each other in many respects-they are both
artificial persons existing for the general purpose of holding
and administering a trust fund-wherein then do they differ?
The trustee exists in the law as the subject of special property
rights and duties, not attributed to him as a natural person or
as an individual, but yet such trustee being known' in the law
by the same name as the riatural person exercising the trust
powers, his conventional legal existence is entirely dependent
upon his continued existence as an individual. When the
individual dies, the trustee dies also, though the law may
immediately resurrect him in the.successor in the trust. The
death of the former is actual and final ; there is no successor
to his rights and duties, and he as a subject thereof ceases to
exist; the death of the latter is conventional-no sooner dead,
than, in his successor, he again lives, a subject of the same
rights and duties, differing in nothing except in name; if the
courts had seen fit to authorize an individual trustee to act as
such under an assumed name, upon his death, evidently the
trustee as such would not have died, but would have con-
tinued to exist under the same name and with the same legal
identity in the successor in the trust. In other words, such
conventional trustee, existing in the law under an assumed
name and therefore possessing under such name the capacity
of succession would, in fact, be a corporation sole. And in
the case of an unincorporated board of trustees this is all the
more plain. We have but to assume the legislature to confer
upon A, B and C, trustees, the right to so act under an assumed
name to immediately convert such individual trustees into a
corporation, the capacity of succession immediately resulting,
if not by the terms of the trust or from the act of legislature,
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then from the inherent power of courts of equity to appoint
successors in trust. That this capacity of succession under
such assumed name is likewise- the one unique quality of
a private corporation having capital stock, is evident from a
comparison with common law joint stock companies. The
common law, as is well known, recognized the right of indi-
viduals to associate themselves together for the purpose of
carrying on an enterprise, commercial or otherwise, with 'a
fixed capital divided into transferable shares and free from any
further individual responsibility whatever. But it was simply
a matter of contract, if the shares were issued and subscribed
for thereunder, the law would enforce it as between parties
thereto; but as to others than parties, such contract was, of
course, not binding. The law recognized the contracts made
in behalf of such association by its agents and the various
rights and duties flowing therefrom, but it did not predicate
such rights and duties of an artificial person existing under the
name of such association, and they could not be enforced in
its name. On the contrary, the common law predicated such
rights and duties of the various individuals composing the
association, by and against whom, therefore, as individuals, all
actions springing therefrom had to be brought. The managers
of the association were but the agents of its members and, as
such, could not make contracts unless properly so empowered,
and such contracts, even if legally made, could not be at law
enforced except at the proper suit of the various individuals
on whose behalf they were entered into. The facts that the
agents of the association were, by the contract between its
members, in nowise authorized to pledge their personal credit,
could not avoid their liability to third parties, unless the latter
were also parties to such contract, since such members were,
in fact, the principals and the very persons primarily respon-
sible for the acts of their agents, the managers of the associa-
tion. It was possible, therefore, at common law, for individuals
to associate themselves together under a contract in all respects
similar to the relation between the members of a stock cor-
poration, and yet such association thus formed had no standing
in court. It could neither sue nor be sued, take nor grant
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,property, except in the name of its members, while the latter,
as individuals, remained fully liable for the contracts of their
agefits, unless such contracts expressly provided to the con-
trary. As the persons composing such association had no
right to act in its name, it in contemplation of law simply did
not exist.
But, if we assume the managers of such association to be
authorized by the state to act independently under an assumed
name, evidently an artificial person will at once exist in con-
templation of law under such name, which can sue and be
sued, buy and sell property, etc., will, in fact, be in evcry
sense of the word a corporation. It may seem strange that,
in creating a corporation, the state should but confer upon
certain persons and their successors such an apparently simple
right as that to act under an assumed name; but, in fact, this
right, simple as it seems to be, is entirely contrary to the
very nature and definition of the common law. As already
stated, such law consists of the rights of persons as enforced
by the state. Duties are but complementary to rights, each
right carrying with it its complementary duty, on the part of
other persons, to observe it; the breach of which duty again
creates the right of redress.
It is this latter right of redress, this right to hold a person
committing a breach of duty personally responsible therefor,
which is the keystone of the entire system. The original right,
indeed, may be said but to exist therein, and, therefore, the
common law could not permit any person to evade or avoid
such personal responsibility for breach of duty. The recogni-
tion in the law of other artificial persons, such as trustees,
while seemingly an exception to, is in reality the best illustra-
tion of this principle. In a trustee the law does not recognize
the right of an individual to avoid his personal responsibility
for his acts, but, on the contrary, the trustee results from the
recognition and enforcement by courts of equity of the duty of
trustees to observe the rights of others. If any person has
any right in and to property legally vested in another, to
protect this right, and to enforce the duty to observe it on the
part of the legal owners of such property, equity raises a trust;
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a trust being but the duty imposed upon a person holding
property belonging to another to observe the rights of the latter.
Exzept for this element of duty a trust could not exist. But,
having thus imposed upon persons special duties, not simply to
observe the rights of others, but often to exercise such rights for
their benefit, in order to better protect such rights, and, also, as
was plainly equitable, to relieve the trustee from his personal
common law responsibility for their exercise, equity recognized
in him as the subject of such rights, an artificial person.
The doctrine of trusts has been extended to many cases to
which it properly has no application, but, nevertheless, it has
never been admittedly summoned into court for other. than'
the nominal purpose of enforcing duties, never for the admitted
purpose of enabling persons to thereby avoid their personal
responsibility for their own voluntary acts.
Plainly, therefore, since it was contrary to the primary prin-
ciples of the common law to release a person from his individual
responsibility for his act, the courts could not recognize the
right of a person to act under an assumed name, and, therefore,
could not recognize the existence of a corporation except by the
expressed or implied authority of the state. Such authority is,
therefore, in every case necessary to the existence of a corpor-
ation; and, vice versa, as we have found in our inquiry, when
by such authority persons are authorized to act under an
assumed name, a corporation immediately results.
A corporation may then be defined as an artificial person,
resulting, in contemplation of law, when one or more persons
are expressly or impliedly authorized by the state to act under
an assumed name.
Henry Winla'ow Williams.
Baltimore, October, x898.
